1/9/2023 0 Comments Irad kimhi philosophy![]() ![]() Yet by thus sundering the logical from the psychological, Frege was unable to explain certain fundamental logical truths, most notably the psychological version of the law of non-contradiction-that one cannot think a thought and its negation simultaneously. Logic does not describe how we actually think, but only how we should. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.Opposing a long-standing orthodoxy of the Western philosophical tradition running from ancient Greek thought until the late nineteenth century, Frege argued that psychological laws of thought-those that explicate how we in fact think-must be distinguished from logical laws of thought-those that formulate and impose rational requirements on thinking. Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons BY-NC license.Authors who publish with the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy agree to the following terms: The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy requires authors to agree to a Creative Commons Attribution /Non-commercial license. The Public Knowledge Project recommends the use of the Creative Commons license. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by David Pears and Brian McGuinness. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. “Sentence Meaning, Negation and Plato’s Problem of Non-Being.” In Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by G. Thought’s Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. “Self-Consciousness, Negation, and Disagreement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(3): 4–16. “Showing, the Middle Voice, and the Unity of the Tractatus.” Philosophical Topics 42(2): 201–62. “Négation et totalité dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein.” In Lire le Tractatus de Wittgenstein, edited by Christiane Chauviré, pp. “Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist.” In The Engaging Intellect, pp. “On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle.” The Review of Metaphysics 24(3): 485–509. “Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist.” The Philosophical Review 81(3): 267–304. “On the Linguistic Turn away from Absolute Idealism.”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.ĭummett, Michael, 1973. “Truth before Tarski: after Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and Van Heijenoort.” In From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy, edited by Erich Reck, pp. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.ĭiamond, Cora, 2002. “Replies to Commentators.” In The Logical Alien, edited by Sofia Miguens, pp. St Andrews, UK: Imprint Academic.Ĭonant, James, 2020. “Belief and Thought.” In Logic, Truth, and Meaning, edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, pp. “Truth: Anselm and Wittgenstein.” In From Plato to Wittgenstein, edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally, pp.
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